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How risk adjustment moves money between insurers, and why members should care

Plain-words explanation of risk adjustment, with a two-insurer example in round numbers, how it differs from reinsurance, and what it means for plan design.

Read an insurer's earnings report or a news story about a plan leaving a state, and you will sometimes see the phrase "risk score" or "risk adjustment payable." It sounds like back-office accounting, and in a sense it is. But it is also one of the quiet rules that makes the ACA's promise possible: that a plan has to accept you whatever your health history.

In short, risk adjustment is a transfer. Plans whose members turn out to be healthier than the market average pay money into a pool, and plans whose members are sicker than average receive money from it. The point is that no insurer should win or lose just because of the luck of who enrolled. The rest of this post walks through how that works with an invented example, what it does and does not do, and why it matters even if you never see it on a bill.

The problem it solves

Under the ACA's rules for the individual and small-group markets, an insurer cannot turn you down or charge you more because you have a pre-existing condition. The guide on pre-existing conditions and health insurance: what the law says covers what that means for you. For the insurer, it removes the old way of managing cost: medical underwriting, meaning screening applicants by health and pricing or refusing them accordingly.

Without underwriting, two insurers can sell identical plans at identical prices and end up with very different costs for reasons neither controls. Maybe one company's plans appeal to young professionals in a city, while another is the only one that includes a large cancer center in its network. The second company's members will use much more care. If nothing evened this out, the second insurer would have to raise its prices, which would drive away more of its healthier members, and the problem would compound. There would also be a quiet incentive to build plans that appeal to healthy people and discourage sick ones. That is the pressure risk adjustment is designed to reduce.

How it works in outline

Each year, for the individual and small-group markets in a state, the government computes a "risk score" for each insurer's plans. The score is an estimate of how costly the members are expected to be, using their age, sex and the diagnoses recorded on their claims. A person with diabetes and heart failure gets a higher score than a healthy 30-year-old. Add up the members and you have the plan's average score. Compare it with the statewide average, adjust for things like the plan's metal level and the local cost of care, and the result says whether the plan owes money or is owed money.

Three features are worth knowing:

  • It is budget-neutral. Every dollar one insurer pays in, another receives. No outside money funds it, which is one of the main differences from reinsurance, covered below.
  • It is based on predicted risk, not on actual spending. The transfer depends on the diagnoses and demographics of the members, not on how much the insurer happened to pay in claims. This keeps an incentive to manage costs: an insurer that runs its plan efficiently keeps the savings.
  • It runs separately in each state and in each market. Individual and small-group markets are calculated separately, and one state's results do not mix with another's.

Medicare Advantage also uses risk adjustment, but there it works differently: the government adjusts the payment it makes to each plan for each member, rather than moving money between plans. That is a separate system, and the audit side of it is described in the glossary entry RADV audit.

A two-insurer example in round numbers

Everything below is a simplified illustration. Real formulas have more steps, and the figures are invented.

Say a state's marketplace has two insurers, Plan A and Plan B. Each has 10,000 members, and each charges a premium that works out to $6,000 per member for the year. The market-wide average expected cost per member is also $6,000. Ignore administrative costs and margin to keep the focus on claims.

  • Plan A's members are healthier. Their risk score is 0.8, meaning expected costs 20% below the average: $6,000 × 0.8 = $4,800 per member.
  • Plan B's members are sicker. Their risk score is 1.2, meaning 20% above the average: $6,000 × 1.2 = $7,200 per member.

Without risk adjustment

  • Plan A collects 10,000 × $6,000 = $60,000,000 and expects to pay 10,000 × $4,800 = $48,000,000 in claims. That leaves $12,000,000.
  • Plan B collects $60,000,000 and expects to pay 10,000 × $7,200 = $72,000,000. That is a $12,000,000 shortfall.

With risk adjustment

The transfer is the gap between the plan's risk score and the average, times the average cost, times the number of members.

  • Plan A: (1.0 − 0.8) × $6,000 × 10,000 = $12,000,000, which it pays into the pool.
  • Plan B: (1.2 − 1.0) × $6,000 × 10,000 = $12,000,000, which it receives from the pool.

Check that it is budget-neutral: Plan A pays $12,000,000, Plan B receives $12,000,000, and the total is zero. After the transfer both plans are at the same point, $0 before administrative costs, because the transfer has removed the advantage that came only from member health.

What the insurer still controls

Now add the part that keeps the system honest. Suppose Plan B runs good care management and its members actually cost $7,000 each, not the $7,200 the risk score predicted.

  • Plan B's claims: 10,000 × $7,000 = $70,000,000.
  • Plan B's net: $60,000,000 premium + $12,000,000 transfer − $70,000,000 claims = $2,000,000.

Plan B keeps the $2,000,000 because the transfer was based on predicted risk. If the transfer reimbursed actual claims instead, it would have no reason to be efficient. This design choice is why the scheme does not just pass costs along.

Why this lets insurers accept everyone

A guarantee of acceptance is only sustainable if the person who gets the sickest members is not punished for it. Risk adjustment lowers the financial reward for avoiding sick members, so an insurer has less reason to try. The guide on How the ACA marketplace works: HealthCare.gov and state exchanges places this in the wider structure of the marketplace, together with the subsidies and the enrollment rules.

It also affects how companies can compete. If an insurer wins members by offering good coverage for a chronic condition, it will attract people with higher scores. Risk adjustment cushions the financial effect. A plan can also build a narrow network and keep its premium low without carrying a mix that is much healthier than average for free, since a healthier mix reduces what it receives or increases what it pays.

None of this is a guarantee against exclusion in practice. Regulators watch network design, drug coverage and other features for signs that a plan is trying to discourage sick people from enrolling. Risk adjustment is one safeguard among several, and it is not a complete one.

How it differs from reinsurance

People often mix up the two, so it helps to compare them directly.

Risk adjustment Reinsurance
What it does Moves money between insurers in the same market Pays an insurer part of its very large claims
Who funds it The insurers with healthier-than-average members An outside source, such as a government fund or fees
What triggers it The mix of members (their risk scores) Individual claims above a set threshold
Net cost to the system Zero, since it is budget-neutral A cost to the fund that pays, which lowers premiums
Typical question it answers "Did I get a sicker mix than the others?" "Did I have a handful of enormously expensive patients?"

State reinsurance programs, which some states have set up with federal waivers, are described in how state reinsurance programs lower marketplace premiums. The glossary entries for state reinsurance program and risk adjustment give short definitions.

The two tools can operate together. An insurer may receive a risk adjustment transfer because its members are sicker on average and a reinsurance payment because of a few catastrophic claims. They address different sources of volatility.

Why members should care

You cannot see risk adjustment on your explanation of benefits, but it shapes a few things you do notice.

  1. Plan availability. An insurer that expects a large risk adjustment payment that it cannot predict may price cautiously, or may leave a market it cannot model. When a company's rate filing or earnings report mentions a "risk score surprise," it means the real mix of members differed from the assumption behind its prices. The post on why an insurer can lose money on marketplace plans, with three example insurers shows three ways that can happen.
  2. Premium filings. The assumptions about risk adjustment appear in rate filings, and a gap between an insurer's assumption and the market's can lead to a large correction the next year.
  3. Plan design. The less an insurer gains by avoiding sicker members, the less reason it has to design benefits or networks to repel them.
  4. Your health information. The diagnoses on claims are part of the data used to compute scores. That data is handled under federal privacy rules, and the same claims information is used for many routine purposes. If you have questions about how your plan uses your records, your plan's privacy notice and the state insurance department are the places to ask.

What critics and supporters say

Supporters say the program is a necessary counterpart to guaranteed issue: it removes the incentive to cherry-pick and keeps insurers focused on managing care. Critics raise several concerns, which vary in weight depending on who is speaking:

  • Coding incentives. Because scores depend on recorded diagnoses, an insurer gains by making sure all of a member's conditions are documented. Supporters say thorough documentation reflects real conditions. Critics worry it can also encourage over-coding.
  • Complexity and timing. Payments are calculated after the year ends, so insurers must estimate what they will owe or receive long before they know it. Some smaller insurers have argued that this uncertainty burdens them more than larger ones. Larger insurers say the formulas are applied evenly.
  • Imperfect prediction. No formula captures all the difference in cost between members. Some conditions are well predicted, and others are not, so a plan with many of the poorly predicted kinds can still lose.

These are real tradeoffs, not settled questions. Regulators adjust the formulas over time, and the specific parameters change, so anyone who needs the current ones should look at the federal rules for the plan year in question.

Questions to ask when you see "risk adjustment" in the news

  • Does the story describe a payment into the pool or a payment from it?
  • Is the insurer's mix of members sicker or healthier than the market, and by what evidence?
  • Was the surprise about the amount of the transfer, the timing, or the insurer's own estimate?
  • Does the insurer say it will change prices or leave a market, and is that supported by its rate filing?

For anything specific to your own plan, a licensed broker, a navigator or the state insurance department can read the filing with you.

Key takeaways

  • Risk adjustment moves money from insurers with healthier-than-average members to insurers with sicker-than-average members within the same state and market.
  • It is budget-neutral and based on predicted risk, not actual spending, so insurers keep the benefit of running plans efficiently.
  • In the two-insurer example, a plan with a 0.8 score pays $12,000,000 and a plan with a 1.2 score receives $12,000,000, leaving both level before administrative costs.
  • Reinsurance is different: it is funded from outside the market and pays part of very large individual claims.
  • Members feel the effects through prices, plan availability and the lower payoff for designing a plan to avoid sick people.

Terms used in this guide

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