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How Medicare pays Medicare Advantage plans, from benchmarks to risk scores
What Medicare pays a plan per member, how a bid is compared with a benchmark, what rebates fund, why diagnosis coding changes payments, and what each side says.
If you have a Medicare Advantage plan, Medicare pays the plan a set amount every month for you, whether or not you see a doctor that month. The plan then pays your claims out of that money. How much Medicare pays for you depends on three things: a local benchmark rate, the plan's own bid to provide your benefits, and a risk score that goes up when your health record shows more or more serious conditions. Debates over "overpayment" and "upcoding" are arguments about the second and third of those.
This post walks through the payment system in plain words, with one worked example in round numbers, and then lays out what supporters and critics say. It is an explanation, not a verdict, and the formulas are simplified: the real ones have more adjustments than a post can cover.
The basic idea: a monthly payment per member
With Original Medicare, the government pays doctors and hospitals each time they deliver a service (fee-for-service). With Medicare Advantage (Part C), you join a private plan, and Medicare pays that plan a fixed amount per member per month. This arrangement is called capitation. The plan is then responsible for covering the services Original Medicare covers (Parts A and B, and usually drugs through a bundled Part D benefit), under rules about networks, prior authorization and cost sharing that the plan sets within limits.
The guide Medicare Advantage explained: how Part C plans work covers how these plans work for members. Here the question is narrower: how is the monthly amount set?
Some scale helps. According to KFF, 35.2 million of the 64.2 million people with Medicare Parts A and B, or 55%, were in a Medicare Advantage plan in 2026. For 2027, CMS projects enrollment of about 34 million, which it puts at about 47.4% of everyone in Medicare (a different base, since it includes people who do not have both Parts A and B). With that many members, small changes in the payment formula move large sums, which is why the formula gets so much attention.
Step 1: The county benchmark
Each county has a benchmark, the maximum base amount Medicare will pay for an average member in that county. It is derived from what Medicare spends per person in Original Medicare in that county. The law then adjusts it: counties with lower Original Medicare spending are given a benchmark set above that spending, and counties with higher spending, below it. The adjustment is designed to give plans in lower-cost areas enough to operate. A plan with a high quality rating can also receive a bonus on the benchmark.
CMS publishes the rate announcement every spring for the coming year. The announcement for 2027 was issued on April 6, 2026, and includes the national growth percentages that update the rates. The details are technical and are in the CMS document.
Step 2: The plan's bid
Every year each plan submits a bid to CMS. The bid is the plan's estimate of what it will cost to provide the Part A and Part B benefits to an average member in its service area, including its administrative costs and its margin. It is not what the plan charges you. The bid is compared with the benchmark:
- If the bid is below the benchmark, the plan is paid its bid, and it also receives a rebate: a share of the difference between the benchmark and the bid. The share depends on the plan's star rating, with higher-rated plans receiving a larger share. The rebate must go to members in the form of extra benefits or lower costs, such as dental, vision and hearing coverage (Medicare Advantage supplemental benefits), a reduction in the Part B premium, a lower drug premium or lower cost sharing.
- If the bid is above the benchmark, the plan is paid the benchmark, and the members pay the difference as a monthly plan premium, on top of the Part B premium.
This is where the extras that Medicare Advantage plans advertise come from. The government does not pay for them separately. They are funded by the gap between the benchmark and the bid, so changes to the benchmark or to the rebate share change what plans can offer.
Step 3: The risk score
The bid and benchmark describe an average member. You are not average, and neither is anyone else. A plan that enrolls many people with heart failure and kidney disease will spend more than a plan that enrolls mostly healthy people. So Medicare adjusts each member's payment with a risk score.
The risk score is built from two things: demographic factors (age, sex, whether the person is on Medicaid, whether they qualified because of disability) and diagnoses recorded in the previous year. Diagnoses are grouped into categories of conditions (the system is often called HCC, for hierarchical condition category), each of which adds to the score. A score of 1.00 means an average expected cost. A score of 1.40 means the person is expected to cost 40% more than average, and the plan is paid about 40% more for that member.
The risk score is why Medicare Advantage plans cannot choose healthy members to make more money: in principle, a plan that enrolls sicker people is paid more. The same mechanism is behind the controversy, because the score depends on which diagnoses are recorded and how. That is explained below.
A related concept exists in ACA marketplace plans, where risk adjustment moves money between insurers rather than from the government to plans. The post how risk adjustment moves money between insurers, and why members should care explains the marketplace version, which works differently.
A worked example, in round numbers
This example is a simplified illustration with invented numbers, not any real plan's figures.
Say a county's benchmark is $1,000 per month for an average member. A plan bids $900 to cover an average member's Part A and B benefits.
- Gap between benchmark and bid: $1,000 − $900 = $100.
- Rebate: for the illustration, say the plan's rating gives it 70% of the gap. 70% × $100 = $70. The plan must use the $70 for extra benefits or lower costs. The government keeps the other $30.
- Base payment for an average member: the bid plus the rebate, $900 + $70 = $970 per month.
- Risk adjustment: multiply by the member's risk score. - A member with a score of 1.00: $970 × 1.00 = $970. - A member with a score of 1.40: $970 × 1.40 = $1,358.
- What coding can change: say the same member is later documented as having an additional condition, which raises the score from 1.40 to 1.50. The monthly payment becomes $970 × 1.50 = $1,455. That is $97 more per month ($1,455 − $1,358), or $1,164 more per year ($97 × 12).
If the plan's bid had been $1,060 instead, higher than the $1,000 benchmark, the plan would be paid the $1,000 benchmark (before risk adjustment) and members would pay the $60 difference as a premium. There would be no rebate.
The example shows why two of the numbers matter. A small change in the bid shapes the extras. A small change in the recorded diagnoses shapes the payment, and in this case a single extra diagnosis changes it by more than a thousand dollars a year for one member.
Where diagnosis coding comes in
Risk scores are only as accurate as the diagnoses behind them. Diagnoses come from claims that doctors and hospitals submit, and from additional sources that plans may use to find conditions, such as reviews of medical charts and health risk assessments done in a member's home. If a member really has a chronic condition that was never recorded, adding it makes the score more accurate. If a condition is recorded that the member does not have, or that is not supported by the medical record, the plan is overpaid.
CMS makes two kinds of adjustment to try to keep the scores fair:
- A coding intensity adjustment, set in law, reduces Medicare Advantage risk scores across the board, on the understanding that plans on average record more diagnoses than Original Medicare does for similar people.
- Audits. Risk adjustment data validation audits (RADV audit) check a sample of members' diagnoses against their medical records, and payments can be recovered when diagnoses are not supported. CMS and the Department of Justice have also pursued cases under the False Claims Act involving coding. The term improper payment covers payments made in error, whether by honest mistake or otherwise.
What supporters and critics say
The positions below are summaries of arguments made by each side. They are not endorsements.
What critics say.
- Government advisers such as the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) and some researchers have concluded that, on average, Medicare pays Medicare Advantage plans more for their members than it would spend if those same members were in Original Medicare. They point to benchmarks set above local fee-for-service spending, to quality bonuses, and to coding intensity.
- Critics argue that higher coding raises payments without any change in how sick members are, that in-home risk assessments and chart reviews are used mainly to find more diagnoses, and that the audit system covers only a small part of the program. They worry that the added money goes to profit and to marketing rather than to care, and that taxpayers and Part B premium payers (who include people in Original Medicare) bear the cost.
- Some argue that rebates fund extra benefits that attract healthy members, so that the plans' advantages come from selection rather than from efficiency.
What supporters say.
- Supporters, including many plans and trade groups, argue that Medicare Advantage gives members an out-of-pocket maximum, extra benefits and care coordination that Original Medicare does not offer by itself, and that the rebate system turns savings into those benefits.
- They argue that better coding finds conditions that were previously undetected, which allows earlier treatment, and that payment should follow the true health of the members.
- They note that plans take on financial risk for their members' costs, that the risk adjustment system was created to pay fairly for sicker members, and that cuts to payments would lead plans to reduce benefits or leave markets.
- Many also point out that the comparison with Original Medicare depends on assumptions about how much healthier or sicker members of each group are, and that estimates differ.
Both sides cite studies, and the answers depend on assumptions (how to measure what the same people would have cost in Original Medicare). Congress, CMS and the courts have made and continue to consider changes. This post does not predict them.
What this means for you as a member
You do not need to settle the argument to use the information.
- The extras are funded by the bid-benchmark gap. If the benchmark or rebate rules change, plans may adjust their benefits, premiums or service areas in later years. For plan year 2027, CMS reported that the average Medicare Advantage monthly premium would fall from $14.37 to $12.00, with 5,532 plans (5,553 in 2026), and the same data shows that 10 firms were leaving the market (as of CMS and KFF releases in fall 2026). See My Medicare Advantage or drug plan ends in December. What do I do now? if your plan is among those ending.
- Your health record affects what the plan is paid. A plan may ask you to complete a health assessment or send a nurse to your home. These are legitimate and often helpful, but they are also tied to the plan's payment. You can decide whether to participate.
- Ratings affect rebates. Star ratings affect both the bonus and the rebate share. See medicare star ratings. A plan's rating can change from year to year.
- A lower premium does not tell you the cost. Compare the maximum out-of-pocket amount, the network, the drug list and the plan's rules on approvals, not just the premium. The guide Original Medicare vs Medicare Advantage: how to compare the two provides a framework.
- The payment system does not set your benefits. Plans must cover what Original Medicare covers. What differs is how, where and with what cost sharing.
If you want a plan-specific answer, a SHIP counselor (the free state counseling program for Medicare) can compare options for your doctors, drugs and budget without selling a plan.
Questions people ask about the system
Does Medicare pay the plan more if I am sicker? Generally yes, through the risk score. That is the purpose of risk adjustment, and it is meant to prevent plans from avoiding sick members.
Does the plan's payment limit what I can get? The plan's payment is a budget for all of its members, not a limit on your care. The plan must cover medically necessary services that Original Medicare covers, subject to its rules.
Do I pay for the plan's payment? Everyone with Part B pays the Part B premium. Some argue that higher Medicare Advantage spending raises that premium for everyone. Others dispute the size of the effect. In simple terms, your own plan premium for medical benefits, if any, reflects the amount by which the bid exceeds the benchmark, as described above; a drug premium is separate.
Why do plans leave markets? A plan may leave when its bid and the benchmark do not leave enough margin, when costs rise faster than payments, or when the company shifts its strategy. The reasons vary by company and county.
Key takeaways
- Medicare pays a Medicare Advantage plan a fixed monthly amount per member, built from a county benchmark, the plan's bid and a risk score for each member.
- If a plan bids below the benchmark, a share of the gap, set by the plan's star rating, comes back as a rebate that must fund extra benefits or lower costs; if it bids above, members pay the difference as a premium.
- Risk scores raise payments for members with more recorded diagnoses, so coding accuracy matters, and CMS uses a coding adjustment and audits to check it.
- Critics argue the system overpays plans compared with Original Medicare; supporters argue it funds benefits and care coordination and pays fairly for sicker members; both depend on contested assumptions.
- For your own choice, compare out-of-pocket limits, networks, drugs and rules on approvals, and ask a SHIP counselor if you want an unbiased comparison.